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When Can aDefendant Challenge His ACCA
Sentence on the Basis That His Prior State
Convictions Were Unconstitutional?
by Michael O'Hear
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 207-211. © 2000 American Bar Association.
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Editor's Note: The respondent's
brief in this case was not available
by PREVIEW's deadline.
In 1984, Congress enacted the
Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA"), which imposes a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence on
certain criminal defendants with
three or more previous convictions.
In the ACCA, Congress did not
expressly indicate whether defendants could challenge their prior
convictions on constitutional
grounds. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that such challenges
were generally prohibited during
sentencing proceedings. Custis v.
Uiited States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994).
The Supreme Court is now asked to
decide whether the same prohibition applies when a defendant
moves to modify his sentence under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.

tody, may the defendant challenge
his ACCA sentence in a § 2255 proceeding on the basis that the prior
convictions are constitutionally
invalid?
FACTS
In April 1994, a federal jury convicted Earthy D. Daniels Jr. of violating
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits
felons from possessing firearms.
Normally, this offense would carry a
maximum term of imprisonment of
10 years. However, Daniels had a
record of at least four prior felony
convictions in state court, including
convictions for burglary in 1978 and
1979 and robbery in 1978 and
1981. Accordingly, the prosecution
requested that Daniels be sentenced
as a career criminal under the
ACCA, which would subject Daniels
to a minimum 15-year term of
imprisonment. The court agreed
that the ACCA applied and imposed
a sentence of 176 months. (Slightly
(Continued on Page 208)
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less than 15 years, this sentence
reflected credit for the time that
Daniels had already served in state
custody for the same offense.) An
appeals court affirmed the sentence
in 1996.
After his unsuccessful appeal,
Daniels launched a new round of
legal proceedings in federal district
court to reduce his sentence. He
relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which
provides a mechanism for prisoners
in federal custody to obtain the correction of sentences that are
"imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United
States." Specifically, Daniels argued
that he could not be legally sentenced as a career criminal under
the ACCA because two of his prior
convictions were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
First, Daniels contended that his
1978 and 1981 robbery convictions
were based on invalid guilty pleas.
He argued that his lawyers did not
properly advise him of the nature of
the crimes to which he was pleading, and that, accordingly, his pleas
of guilty were not intelligent and
voluntary. Second, Daniels contended that his 1981 robbery conviction
was also invalid because his lawyer
did not seek to suppress a damaging
statement that Daniels had made
after his arrest-an arrest that was
arguably in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
If Daniels could demonstrate that
the 1979 and 1981 robbery convictions were invalid, then he would
apparently be left with a record of
only two prior felony convictions.
Because the ACCA applies only to
offenders with three or more priors,
Daniels would be relieved of the
ACCA's harsh mandatory minimum
sentence. Indeed, absent application
of the ACCA, Daniels' presumptive
sentence under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines would be
between 84 and 105 months-some-

thing close to half his ACCA-based
sentence.
However, the federal district court
declined to review Daniels' challenge to the prior convictions.
Instead, the court denied Daniels' §
2255 motion on procedural grounds,
relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Custis v. United States.
Custis was a felon-in-possession
case similar to Daniels. At his sentencing, Custis resisted application
of the ACCA by attempting to challenge the validity of his prior convictions. In other words, Custis
raised the same sorts of issues that
Daniels raised, but in a different
procedural setting: that is, at the
initial sentencing hearing rather
than at a subsequent § 2255 proceeding. However, the district court
held that Custis was precluded from
attacking his priors at sentencing.
The Supreme Court affirmed, indicating that a defendant could raise
only one type of challenge to a prior
conviction at sentencing, specifically, that the defendant had been
denied his constitutional right to
have a lawyer. Such a claim was not
made by Custis, nor is it now made
by Daniels. *
The district court in Daniels saw no
reason to distinguish a § 2255 proceeding from a sentencing hearing.
In affirming the district court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that Daniels' claims
were foreclosed by Custis. United
States v. Daniels, 195 F.3d 501 (9th
Cir. 1999). Daniels petitioned the
Supreme Court to address the issue
on April 12, 2000. His petition was
granted on Sept. 8, 2000.
CASE ANALYSIS
In a sense, the legal arguments in
this case boil down to a rather narrow question: Does the Supreme
Court's holding in Custis apply to §
2255 proceedings, or is Custis limited to sentencing? The constitution-
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ality of Daniels' state convictions is
not before the Court. Indeed,
Daniels will never be able to present
his constitutional challenges unless
he wins the current appeal. Nor is
the correctness of Custis itself likely
to be at issue. Daniels has not asked
the Court to overturn Custis, andwith all six members of the Custis
majority still on the Court-no
reversal seems likely. Thus, the success or failure of Daniels' appeal will
likely turn on his ability to distinguish Custis.
Before turning to the substance of
Custis, some additional background
may be helpful. Federal law permits
prison inmates to challenge their
convictions and/or sentences in federal district court. Section 2255
provides the mechanism for federal
inmates, while § 2254 performs the
same function for state inmates.
(State inmates may also be able to
invoke analogous state laws in state
court.) In effect, these provisions
give inmates a second chance to
contest their guilt or the imposition
of a particular sentence, typically on
the basis of the discovery of new
evidence or the violation of certain
constitutional rights. Because these
provisions fly in the face of our normal expectation that court judgments will be final, they are subject
to substantial procedural obstacles,
including a requirement that, absent
special circumstances, proceedings
be initiated within one year after a
conviction becomes final.
Additionally, § 2255 motions must
be presented to the same court that
heard the case the first time around.
Custis did not squarely address §
2255, but the Supreme Court's
analysis turned on a set of concerns
that are not limited to the sentencing context. Specifically, the Court's
decision rested on four points. First,
the Court held that the ACCA itself
does not authorize defendants to
challenge their prior convictions.

Issue No. 4

This point is not at issue in Daniels'
appeal and need not be further discussed. Second, of greater present
importance, the Court held that neither does the Constitution authorize
such challenges. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court distinguished
two older Supreme Court decisions,
Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109
(1967), and United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443 (1972). In Burgett and
Tucker, the Court permitted challenges to enhanced sentences based
on unconstitutional prior convictions. However, both cases involved
a particular type of constitutional
claim, namely, that the defendants
had been denied their rights to
appointed legal counsel. The Custis
Court distinguished the earlier decisions on precisely this basis, reasoning that denying legal representation
raises more fundamental concerns
than does denying other constitutional rights. 511 U.S. at 496.
Because Custis had a lawyer-albeit
an allegedly ineffective one-the
Constitution did not require that his
claims be heard.
Third, the Supreme Court expressed
concerns about the administrative
burdens that would be imposed at
sentencing if prior convictions were
allowed to be challenged: sentencing
courts would be required "to rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to obtain state-court
transcripts or records that may date
from another era, and may come
from any one of the 50 States." Id.
Fourth, the Court noted the benefits
of finality. Continued challenges to
prior convictions "undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures and inevitably delay and
impair the orderly administration of
justice." Id. at 497 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court's invocation of administrability and finality suggest that it
decided Custis on the basis of an
interest-balancing analysis.

Following this lead, interest balancing lies at the heart of Daniels'
appeal. In essence, Daniels attempts
to limit Custis to sentencing by
arguing as follows: (1) society has
an interest in ensuring that sentences are not based on unconstitutional prior convictions; (2) these
interests are more weighty at the §
2255 stage than at sentencing; and
(3) society's countervailing interests
in administrability and finality are
less weighty.
Daniels begins his argument by
identifying a broader constitutional
principle in Burgett and Tucker
than Custis found: the due process
clause of the Constitution prohibits
courts from basing sentences on
prior convictions that are "materially untrue." Pet. Br. at 7 (quoting
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736,
741 (1948)). A line of federal cases
prior to Custis indicates that this
prohibition encompasses a range of
constitutional defects in addition to
the denial of counsel. Pet. Br. at 910 (citing cases). For the same reason that an uncounseled prior conviction may be an unreliable indicator of a defendant's criminal history,
Daniels reasons, prior convictions
associated with other constitutional
violations may be equally untrustworthy. Pet. Br. at 11.
In Daniels' view, Custis did nothing
to upset the preexisting ban on the
use of unconstitutional prior convictions. "Custis presented a forum
question. The issue was where, not
whether, the defendant could attack
a prior conviction for constitutional
infirmity." Pet. Br. at 14 (quoting
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738, 765 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). While Custis held that
sentencing was not the right forum,
Custis did not rule one way or
another on § 2255. Given a due
process right not to be sentenced on
the basis of unconstitutional priors,
the question remains: procedurally,

at what point can the right be vindicated? In answer to this question,
Daniels in effect poses another: If
not now, when?
In Custis, the Court suggested that
defendants could deal with unconstitutional priors through a two-step
process: (1) obtain reversal of the
prior state conviction through
§ 2254 or a state-law analog; then
(2) apply for resentencing in federal
court on the basis of the corrected
criminal history. 511 U.S. at 497.
But Daniels is procedurally barred
from the first step. Pet. Br. at 16.
Under the applicable state and federal laws, he can no longer challenge his state-court convictions
because he is no longer in state custody. For Daniels, it will be § 2255
or nothing. Such now-or-never concerns are not present at sentencing,
and, Daniels argues, provide a basis
for distinguishing Custis.
But, the United States counters, if
Daniels faces a now-or-never dilemma, the dilemma is of his own making. If Daniels had meritorious constitutional challenges to his prior
convictions, he should have raised
those challenges while he was still
in state custody. In the interests of
finality, federal law imposes a multitude of restrictions on the review of
state-court convictions, such as the
requirement that § 2254 proceedings generally be initiated one year
after the conviction becomes final.
Why, the United States seems to
ask, should we regard a procedural
bar on challenges like Daniels' as
any more unjust than a bar on
bringing § 2254 claims even one day
after the one-year limit? Indeed,
would not § 2255 challenges like
Daniels' effectively circumvent the
one-year bar?
Daniels notes, however, that one
should not assume constitutional
claims could have been raised earli(Continued on Page 210)
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er. For instance, if a defendant's
lawyer is incompetent, in violation
of the Constitution, the defendant
certainly cannot rely on this same
lawyer to advise him of the fact.
Likewise, evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct or witness perjury may
not come to light until long after a
conviction has become final.
Indeed, the law provides
exceptions to the one-year bar
in such circumstances.
As the Court weighs these arguments, it will no doubt also bear in
mind the administrability and finality concerns raised in Custis. Here,
too, Daniels attempts to distinguish
the earlier case. Daniels contends
that courts are accustomed to performing fact-intensive inquiries in §
2255 hearings; the administrative
burdens of federal review are thus
somehow lessened in the § 2255
context. Likewise, Daniels attempts
to neutralize the finality issue by
suggesting that the finality interests
are reduced in cases, such as his,
where the underlying state sentences have already been served in
their entirety. "[Tihe state suffers
no prejudice if the district court
subsequently finds the prior conviction an invalid basis for an
increased federal sentence. That
action will not affect the state's
judgment, and the state will not
need to retry the defendant; it only
eliminates the conviction's use to
enhance a federal sentence." Pet.
Br. at 25.
Still, the dispute in this case seems
likely to play out as disputes over
procedural bars inevitably do. One
side argues that courts are there to
vindicate rights and should give parties every opportunity to be heard
on the merits. The other side raises
concerns about administrative burdens and finality, while suggesting
that any fault lies not with the procedural rules but with litigants who
sleep on their rights until it is too

late. Daniels' difficulty here is that
the Court already staked out a
strong position on the administrability/finality side in Custis, andDaniels' arguments notwithstanding-it is hard to see how the
administrability/finality interests
differ substantially under § 2255.
Indeed, as the United States notes,
Daniels' arguments would produce a
rather odd procedural result: his
reading of Custis would "prohibit
claims like [Daniels'] at sentencing,
but ... require courts to adjudicate
those claims a day-or even an
hour-after the sentencing proceedings have been completed." Resp.
Br. at 8.
Daniels' best hope may lie in the
possibility that the Court did not
fully appreciate the plight of defendants like himself who lack any
recourse to the two-step remedial
process envisioned in Custis. If §
2255 really is a now-or-never opportunity to vindicate constitutional
rights for defendants like Daniels,
the Court may be reluctant to strip
that opportunity away, even if an
unusual procedural rule would
result.
SIGNIFICANCE
Even if Daniels wins his appeal, he
will still be a long way from reducing his sentence: the burden will lie
with him to establish that at least
two of his prior convictions were
unconstitutional. Still, for Daniels
and many others sentenced under
the ACCA, this case has great significance. Because the ACCA imposes
such severe sentences on repeat
offenders, many years' imprisonment may turn on challenges to the
validity of prior convictions. With so
much at stake, even a long-shot
opportunity for sentence reduction
is far preferable to no shot.
For similar reasons, this case is of
interest to advocates of tough-sentencing laws, such as amicus curiae

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.
The foundation notes in its brief
that "habitual criminals" are
responsible for a disproportionate
share of crime. The foundation is
concerned that some such criminals
may take advantage of legal technicalities-constitutional violations
that do not bear on actual guilt or
innocence-at the § 2255 stage in
order to avoid incarceration under
the ACCA. In other words, if Daniels
wins, some habitual criminals may
be released from prison many years
earlier than they would have been
otherwise.
Further, the impact of this case is
not limited to those prosecuted or
sentenced under the ACCA. Many
other statutes impose enhanced
sentences for repeat offenders, as do
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Courts have relied on Custis to preclude attacks on priors outside the
ACCA context. See, e.g., United
States v. Thomas, 42 F.3d 823 (3d
Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant
cannot challenge priors used to
enhance a sentence under the
guidelines). Presumably, Daniels
will have similar reach.
Criminal history has traditionally
played an important role at sentencing in this country. However, sentencing reform over the past two
decades has given criminal history a
vastly increased prominence, perhaps best illustrated by the many
"three strikes" laws enacted at the
federal and state levels.
Consequently, in many criminal
cases, the defendant's sentence is
determined less by the immediate
offense than by the number and
seriousness of prior offenses. The
Court confronted a classic example
in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983), in which the defendant was
sentenced under a recidivism
statute to life imprisonment without
possibility of parole for passing a
bad check for $100. Such harsh sen-
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tences reflect an abandonment of
rehabilitative goals in the sentencing of repeat offenders. Instead, the
objective seems to be incapacitation: simply lock them up and get
them off the streets for as long as
possible.
As sentencing laws have evolved,
the Supreme Court has confronted a
series of cases raising various types
of legal challenges to the use of
prior convictions. The Court has at
times struggled to balance the legislative desire for punishment of
repeat offenders that is swift, certain, and severe, with the demands
of defendants for greater procedural
and substantive fairness. The
Court's sharply divided decision in
Solem, which rejected the defendant's sentence as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, provides a
good example. Following Solem,
Custis and others in this line of
cases, Daniels now gives the Court
yet another opportunity to articulate the constitutional parameters in
this increasingly important aspect of
sentencing law.
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For Earthy D. Daniels (Guy Michael
Tanaka (213) 894-4140)
For the United States (Seth P.
Waxman, Solicitor General,
U.S. Department of Justice
(202) 514-2217)

AMIcus BRIEFS (AS OF

DEC. 11)
In Support of the United States
Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation (Kent S. Scheidegger
(916) 446-0945)
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